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Abstract 
This study examines the effects of counterterrorism policing tactics on public cooperation 
amongst Muslim communities in London, U.K. It tests a procedural justice model developed in 
the context of studying crime control in the United States. The study reports results of a random-
sample survey of 300 closed and fixed response telephone interviews conducted in Greater 
London’s Muslim community in February and March 2010. It tests predictors of cooperation 
with police acting against terrorism. Specifically, the study provides a quantitative analysis of 
how perceptions of police efficacy, greater terrorism threat, and the choice of policing tactics 
predict the willingness to cooperate voluntarily in law enforcement efforts against terrorism. 
Cooperation is defined to have two elements: a general receptivity toward helping the police in 
anti-terror work, and a specific willingness to alert police upon becoming aware of a terror-
related risk in a community. We find that procedural justice concerns prove better predictors for 
both measures of cooperation in counter-terrorism policing among British Muslims. Unlike 
previous studies of policing in the United States, however, we find no correlation between 
judgments about the legitimacy of police and cooperation. Rather procedural justice judgments 
influence cooperation directly.  
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Introduction 
After terrorist attacks in New York, London, Glasgow, Madrid, and other major urban 
centers, police in the United States and Europe have been tasked with dual functions of crime 
control and terrorism prevention. Policing responses to the newly perceived terrorism threat has 
concentrated on Muslim communities of South Asian, Middle Eastern, and North African origin. 
These communities on the one hand have been subject to more intensive and burdensome police 
scrutiny and intrusion. Law enforcement has also cultivated ties with Muslim communities to 
secure cooperation in obtaining information about potential terrorist recruitment and planning, 
and to overcome the cultural and linguistic differences that increase the cost to police of 
gathering information absent cooperation from members of the Muslim community. Such 
cooperation has already proved important in preventing several terrorism attempts (Schulhofer et 
al. 2011). 
How do the choice of investigative tactics and the perception of police as either effective 
or ineffective, and either discriminatory or fair, interact with public cooperation?  This study 
addresses the relationship between counterterrorism policing tactics and public cooperation 
within Muslim communities in London, U.K. We report here the results of a random-sample 
survey of 300 closed and fixed response telephone interviews conducted in Greater London in 
February and March 2010 testing predictors of cooperation among the British Muslim 
community. This is the first study to examine empirically the dynamics of policing against terror 
in this important U.K. population. Specifically, the study provides a quantitative analysis of how 
different policing tactics correlate to different levels of willingness to cooperate voluntarily with 
police in efforts against terrorism. As discussed below, cooperation is defined in the study to 
have two elements: first, a general receptivity toward helping the police in anti-terror work, and 
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second, the specific willingness to alert police upon becoming aware of a terror-related risk in a 
community.   
Drawing on this data, we evaluate three potential explanations for public cooperation by 
British Muslim communities with police. The first two mechanisms are derived from previous 
studies (largely conducted in the United States) of public cooperation with police in ordinary 
crime control efforts and of compliance with laws. First, studies have hypothesized an 
instrumental mechanism whereby people estimate and act on the basis of net expected benefits or 
costs from cooperation with the law (Becker 1976, Posner 1985). Second, other studies have 
identified “procedural justice” explanations for public cooperation with law enforcement. The 
procedural justice model posits a two-stage explanation: People respond to their belief that police 
are a legitimate authority, which in turn is a function of the fairness and procedural justice of 
police procedures in formulating and implementing policies (MacCoun 2005; Tyler 2006b; Tyler 
and Huo 2002). This study independently tests both elements of this mechanism. 
 The third explanation for public cooperation—examined for the first time in this study—
is political and religious ideologies. We use the term “ideology” to refer to normative judgments 
derived from systemic judgments about political systems (Kennedy 1979). Ideology so defined is 
a potentially relevant factor in this study because of the difference between ordinary crime and 
terrorism: Terrorism is typically motivated by a political or religious critique of the government. 
Its use and its acceptance are potentially influenced by value-based judgments about the 
appropriateness of using violence toward innocent people to achieve political and religious 
objectives. Therefore, attitudes toward terrorism may also be motivated by allegiance to external 
political communities defined in either religious or political terms.  
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 London is an appropriate locus of a study whose purpose is testing the strength of these 
explanations. It was the location of a major successful terrorist attack in July 2005. There have 
been numerous arrests of British Muslims alleged to be connected to terrorist conspiracies 
(Pargeter 2008). Further it has a substantial Muslim population. A 2001 census estimated that 8.5 
percent of Londoners were Muslim (Mayor of London 2006).  
On-the-ground policing has also changed in London in response to terrorist threats. The 
British parliament enacted omnibus anti-terrorism laws in 2001, 2005, 2006, and 2008, 
supplementing terrorism-related powers passed into law in 2000 (Mythen et al. 2009; Donohue 
2008). These laws expanded police authority on the ground.  Section 44 of the 2000 Terrorism 
Act, for example, vested police with controversial authority to engage in investigative street 
stops based upon their discretionary risk judgments (Walker 2009). Counter-terrorism 
intelligence officers have been installed at the borough level across London (Clarke 2007). The 
Home Office’s Office for Security and Counter Terrorism also distributes to local police “heat 
maps” identifying areas of high risk for “producing violent extremists” (Turley 2007). New anti-
terrorism policing powers in Britain have further led to allegations that police direct 
disproportionate resources toward Muslim and South Asian communities or otherwise engage in 
“profiling” (Chakrabarti 2007; HCLCG 2010; Kundnani 2009; Mirza et al. 2007, Travis 2010).  
In summary, London is characterized by an arguably high terrorism threat level, by the 
emergence of new and potentially intrusive forms of policing, and by a religiously/ethnically 
diverse population possibly holding sympathetic views about terrorism and negative evaluations 
of the police and the UK government more generally. It therefore provides a plausible location in 
which to study competing explanations for public cooperation in anti-terrorism policing. 
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 The paper has six sections. The first explores the role of public cooperation in ordinary 
counter-terror policing. The second identifies different possible mechanisms for eliciting 
cooperation. The third section briefly reviews recent changes to terrorism-related policing in the 
United Kingdom and surveys existing research about their effect on British Muslim 
communities. The fourth outlines the methodology of the study and its limitations. The fifth 
section presents the data. The final section discusses the results and draws implications for 
further study.   
 
I. Cooperation with Police 
 Cooperation between police and communities is almost uniformly viewed as good. 
Policing specialists and scholars have long recognized the value of cooperation in generating 
social order. The Metropolitan Police’s founders stressed public cooperation (Reich 1956). More 
recently, studies from the United States suggest that policing strategies eliciting community 
cooperation have a potentially more significant effect on ordinary crime than strategies that do 
not involve the community (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994, Hughes and Rowe 2007). 
 Does public cooperation matter to the success of policing against terror as well to 
policing against ordinary crime? This is a question subject to continuing debate, but the weight 
of evidence suggests that cooperation is at least as valuable to the police in the counterterrorism 
context as in the crime control context, and is therefore worth studying. In fact, it may be of 
greater value because the police are more likely to be “outsiders” within the Muslim community. 
On the one hand, some policing experts have argued for the adaption of a “broken 
windows” policing approach to countering terrorism (Kelling and Bratton 2006). Drawing 
inspiration from what they characterize as an Israeli approach to counter-terrorism policing, they 
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argue for creation of a comprehensive “terrorist unfriendly” environment through cameras, 
random screenings, and sensors. Others use rational choice models to propose group-based 
sanctions against communities in which terrorists operate (Garoupa et al. 2006). These proposals 
implicitly discount the value of cooperation from the ethnic and religious communities generally 
targeted in terrorism investigations.  This is the case because such “unfriendly” policies seem 
likely to undermine cooperation. For example, the fourth of Charles Rowan and Richard 
Mayne’s nine articles of U.K. policing was: “To recognize always the extent to which the co-
operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionally to the necessity of the use of 
physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives” (Reith 1956).  
On the other hand, empirical evidence and police practice provide grounds for 
questioning a preference for harsh measures in counterterrorism policing (Schulhofer et al, 
2011). First, empirical claims by “broken windows” advocates have been subject to 
comprehensive criticism even in the crime control context (Harcourt 2001; Zimring 2011). 
Second, although “very little is known about the nature and effectiveness of police 
counterterrorism strategies (Lum et al. 2009)”, empirical evidence from analogous contexts 
suggests that counterterrorism strategies that depend on coercive measures have limited effects. 
Lafree, Dugan and Korte, for example, estimate the deterrence effects and backlash effects of six 
policing and military interventions in the Northern Ireland context between 1969 and 1992 
(Lafree et al. 2009). While their study does not directly address cooperation it investigates the 
predictors of terrorist violence. Across the six interventions, Lafree et al. found a backlash effect 
in three cases—i.e., that these interventions increased terrorist violence—deterrence effects in 
one case, and two interventions with no statistically significant impact. Their findings suggest 
that a deterrence-based model of harsh measures against terrorism can be counterproductive. 
8/29/2011 
 
8 
Their result is supported by Berrebi and Klor’s analysis of dynamic interactions between 
terrorism in the Israel-Palestine conflict and electoral outcomes, which found no correlation 
between more aggressive policies and reductions in terrorism levels (Berrebi and Klor 2006).  
Third, counterterrorism policing strategy in the United Kingdom recognizes the value of 
cultivating public cooperation within British Muslim communities. A “Muslim Contact Unit” has 
been formed in London for outreach to groups that otherwise would have little contact with the 
state (Lambert 2007). In 2007, Peter Clarke, then Deputy Assistant Commission for the Counter 
Terrorism Command of the Metropolitan Police and National Coordinator of Terrorist 
Investigations stated: “One of the challenges for counter-terrorist policing is … not [to] lose our 
local connections within communities. We must include the flow of information coming from 
communities” (Clarke 2007).  
Some empirical studies of terrorism predict that public cooperation will be especially 
valuable to counterterrorism policing. Terrorism is a relatively dispersed and infrequent 
phenomenon. It poses a threat to a near-infinite range of symbolic targets, typically using 
operatives with no prior record of terrorist activity. As a result, accurate and timely information 
to distinguish genuine threats from background noise has great value. The difficulty of 
identifying real risks in communities and cultures that are unfamiliar to law enforcement 
community may mean that public cooperation is even more important than in the crime control 
context (Huq 2011). Post-2001 terrorist attempts have often involved individuals who developed 
connections with terrorist organizations and violent plans while living in European or Britain 
Muslim communities (Roy 2004, Sageman 2004, Sageman 2008). To the extent that terrorist 
groups seek either to recruit or hide within co-religionist communities, cooperation can provide 
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information at lower cost and with fewer negative side effects than coercive or intrusive forms of 
intelligence gathering (Hasini et al. 2009).  
 It is therefore plausible that cooperation from Muslim communities in London or cities of 
its ilk is valuable in the case of counterterrorism just as public cooperation is valuable to ordinary 
crime control. Understanding the mechanisms by which such cooperation is either produced or 
mitigated is therefore worthwhile.  
 
II. Mechanisms of Public Cooperation with Police  
 The predictors of public cooperation with police in ordinary crime-control efforts have 
been the subject of past studies in the United States. We draw on those studies to identify 
potential mechanisms that could explain variance in cooperation within the population of British 
Muslims sampled in our study. Previous research suggests two principal mechanisms, one 
instrumental and the other normative. We further recognize that terrorism is importantly different 
from ordinary crime. Thus it is important to include a third potentially important factor shaping 
cooperation. Terrorism has an ideological dimension that ordinary crime typically does not. We 
therefore propose a third mechanism that reflects the difference between crime and terrorism.  
 The first possible explanation for public cooperation with police is instrumental and 
grounded in a rational-choice model of human decision-making. In An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham outlined an account of punishment as justified 
when expected cost outweighed expected benefits (Bentham 1996). This account implies that 
people cooperate with law enforcement in expectation of net gains from compliance—e.g., 
increased safety—or of net losses from noncooperation—e.g., increased unwelcome and 
burdensome attention from law enforcement (Becker 1976, Posner 1985). Police following the 
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instrumental model encourage cooperative behavior by making community residents’ 
cooperation more rewarding, for example by showing police are effective in fighting crime 
(Kelling & Coles, 1996), by punishing more rule breakers (Bayley & Mendelsohn, 1968; Nagin, 
1998), or by channeling unwelcome policing resources and attention toward uncooperative 
communities.  
We focus on a simple instrumental model because it reflects an important strand in 
British policing. An instrumental approach to policing based on a simple rationale of deterrence 
dominated British policing policy through the 1980s (Hough 2007; Mclaughlin et al. 2001). In 
the 1990s, instrumental logic motivated the British government’s model of ‘new public 
managerialism’. This approach to policing emphasized tangible results, targets, league tables, 
costing and market testing of activities (McLaughlin et al. 2001). In a quintessentially 
instrumental approach to crime control, new public managerialism “pric[ed]” offenses to 
calibrate optimal sanctions (Garland 2001, 130). It is therefore appropriate to ask whether a 
straightforward cost-benefit approach of this type explains public cooperation in the case of new 
efforts to combat terrorism.  
 The second account of public cooperation with the police is based on ideas of procedural 
justice. This model has two elements. It first extrapolates from Max Weber’s identification of 
legitimacy as a necessary antecedent of the state’s preservation of social order (Tyler 2006a). 
Weber stipulated that the state possessed a monopoly on the use of force, but nevertheless 
contended that it could not preserve order through force alone. Legitimacy, Weber argued, 
provided the needed supplement (Weber 1968). A recent survey defines a legitimate authority as 
one “regarded by people as entitled to have its decisions and rules accepted and followed by 
others (Skogan & Frydl 2003, p. 297)”.  
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The second element connects legitimacy to the procedural justice of police behavior. 
Research on legitimacy in the United States shows that the legitimacy of an institution correlates 
with the extent to which it behaves with procedural justice (Sunshine & Tyler 2003a, Tyler 
2006b). Procedural justice has two key elements: first, the quality of the process used to make 
decisions and second, the quality of the interpersonal treatment that people receive when dealing 
with authorities (Tyler 2006b). The measurement of procedural justice therefore looks to several 
aspects of institutional behavior, including whether officials allow people to provide input before 
making decisions; whether officials exercise authority in neutral and consistent ways; whether 
they are perceived as trustworthy; and whether they treat people with whom they deal with 
dignity and respect (Tyler 2000, Tyler 2006b). In this study, we distinguish and address 
separately the legitimacy and procedural justice elements in this model. 
 Originally developed to model and explain variance in compliance with the law, the 
procedural justice model has been extended to cooperation with law enforcement entities 
(Sunshine and Tyler 2003a; Tyler and Fagan 2008). Procedural justice studies have further been 
extended to interactions between US police and racial minorities (Sunshine and Tyler 2003a, 
532; Tyler 2005; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Tyler and Huo, 2001). The model has also been 
replicated outside the US (Tyler et al. 2000; Tyler 2007b). For example, one study found support 
for extra-legal law enforcement (vigilantism) in Ghana to be explained by procedural justice but 
not by measures of police effectiveness (Tanekebe 2009). There is some evidence that procedural 
justice effects are not found in all non-American/European cultures. Studies conducted in China, 
for example, suggest that procedural justice effects are not found in work settings in that context 
(Brockner et al. 2001).    
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 In the crime-control context, the procedural justice account has been found to perform 
better than the instrumental model in predicting both compliance with the law and cooperation 
with law enforcement authorities. An extensive literature in the United States consistently finds 
correlations between procedural justice and legitimacy on the one hand, and between legitimacy 
and compliance with the law on the other (Tyler 2009). In respect to ordinary policing, empirical 
studies by contrast find only weak support for instrumental accounts of either cooperation with 
law enforcement or compliance with the law (Tyler 2006b, 2009; Tyler 2007; Tyler & Fagan, 
2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  
The procedural justice model has been extended in the United States to the counter-
terrorism context. In a study with a similar Muslim sample, Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq (2010) 
analyze the interaction between American law enforcement and Muslim Americans in New York 
City. They find strong procedural justice effects on cooperation both generally and when 
cooperation is defined as willingness to alert police of potentially suspicious behavior (Tyler et 
al. 2010). They also find that the effect of procedural justice is mediated through legitimacy as 
has been the case in other procedural justice studies. By contrast, they find no statistically 
significant correlation between expected costs or benefits of counter-terrorism and cooperation. 
This New York City study provides threshold ground for thinking that models of public 
cooperation in the crime-control context can be profitably transferred to the counterterrorism 
context.  
The American and the European criminal justice contexts, however, are different in ways 
that might influence the dynamics of cooperation (Whitman 2003). The relationship between the 
Muslim population and dominant social institutions is also not the same, with the United States 
distinctive in its history of assimilating minority populations that in other countries continue 
8/29/2011 
 
13 
separate traditions and loyalties across generations. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that a result 
generated in the American context will be generalizable to a European context.    
This study also allows a third set of hypotheses to be tested. This third model focuses 
upon ideology and suggests that individuals will be less willing to cooperate with police against 
terrorism when they have increasingly positive assessments of either the political causes 
espoused by terrorists or the religious justifications invoked by terrorist organizations for 
violence against civilians. These are “ideological” explanations for cooperation. They predict 
that noncooperation will be linked to an acceptance of the general normative framework and the 
specific political goals offered by terrorists. In this sense terrorism is a recent manifestation of a 
long history of conflicts between the state and people motivated by religious values (Kelman and 
Hamilton 1989) or alternative political ideologies (Klandermans 1997).  
The most significant terrorist organization for the purpose of this study is al Qaeda. Its 
claims are based on appeals to religious solidarity and to shared opposition of American, British, 
or European foreign policies (Habeck 2007; Kepel and Milelli 2010). Among al Qaeda’s 
recruitment tools is on-line literature espousing the Salafist strand of Islamic thought (Cronin 
2010, 173). Al Qaeda literature also emphasizes Muslim disagreement with foreign policy 
decisions by American and European government policy, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, decisions widely opposed in the Muslim 
community (Kepel 2004; Roy 2008, 156-57). Domestic policy disagreements also figure in al 
Qaeda’s arguments (Mamdani 2005). In a 2004 “Message to the American People,” for example, 
Osama bin Laden invoked the “despotism and contempt for freedom [of] the Patriot Act (Kepel 
and Milelli 2010, 74)”. Both political and religious differences, therefore, are potentially relevant 
for predicting attitudes toward the legitimacy of terrorism. Because of their relevance, they make 
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shape cooperation against terrorism differently than attitudes to ordinary crime (for a direct 
comparison using U.S. data see Huq, Tyler and Schulhofer, 2011). 
In labeling these explanations “ideological”, we follow the terminology of the U.K. 
government. In the 2010 statement of national counterterrorism policy, that government 
identified the “ideology that supports violent extremism” as a key source of terrorist risk (HM 
Government 2010, 12). Counterterrorism strategy in Britain addresses this ideology through 
tactics that focus on addressing political and religious ideology. The U.K. government has 
funded debates on both political and religious matters to counteract al Qaeda recruitment efforts. 
Part of the British government’s “Prevent” strategy, for example, has been the funding of 
“prominent domestic and international Islamic scholars” to promote a “Radical Middle Way,” 
and effort by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office “to take part in discussions with British 
Muslims on foreign policy issues of concern (HM Government 2009, 14-18). These efforts have 
been controversial. They are criticized as favoring more religious Muslims over more secular 
ones, and disadvantaging non-Muslim South Asians and Caribbean groups (HCCLGC 2010).  
“Ideology” encompasses several elements. It is necessary to be more precise in order to 
operationalize it for the purposes of this study. Ideological explanations generate three possible 
hypotheses concerning cooperation relevant to this study. First, cooperation may be correlated 
with views on foreign policy decisions that al Qaeda focuses upon, such as the Middle East 
conflict, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay. Second, 
cooperation may be correlated with acceptance of the means used by terrorists. In particular, 
terrorism involves the willingness to kill people at best marginally linked to the policies terrorists 
oppose and most typically considered to be innocent bystanders. Thirdly, cooperation may 
decline with increased religious (specifically Muslim) identity because of feelings of solidarity 
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with the culture from which most terrorists emerge and whose imagery and values are used by 
terrorists to explain and justify their actions. The questionnaire used in this study allows us to 
test each of these three hypotheses.   
 
III. The Context of Policing against Terrorism in the United Kingdom  
This section provides background for this study. It summarizes past empirical research 
into the policing of British Muslim communities. Past studies, however, provide little data about 
the relative strength of possible explanations for cooperation in counterterrorism policing. They 
do suggest, however, that the population that this study focuses upon should contain a diversity 
of views about the efficacy and fairness of police and a diversity of normative judgments about 
the British state and terrorism.  
Large Muslim populations have resided in the United Kingdom since the 1960s (Ansari 
2004). The 2001 National Census found 1.6 million Muslims; 68 percent were of South Asian 
ethnicity (Choudhury et al. 2005, Fetzer and Soper 2005, Hellyar 2007). Studies of British 
Muslims suggest a variety of normative judgments about terrorism and the British state. Through 
a telephone survey of 1,003 Muslims sampled from the UK, Mirza et al. identify 
intergenerational increases in reported religiosity and little support for terrorist organizations. 
They report that 7% of respondents in their sample “admire organizations like Al-Qaeda” (Mirza 
et al. 2007). By contrast, a Gallup study based on a probability sample of London Muslims in 
late 2006 and early 2007, found Muslims in their sample as likely as members of the general 
public to condemn terrorist attacks on civilians and slightly more likely than the general public 
(81% v. 72%) to find no moral justification for the use of violence in a “noble cause (Mogahed 
2007)”. These studies do not suggest that at least some U.K. Muslims maintain ideological 
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postures that are particularly supportive of terrorism, but they do not directly examine the impact 
of Muslim ideologies upon cooperation with the police. 
British Muslims also appear to have divergent judgments about the procedural justice and 
efficacy of the police. Muslim civil society groups argue that new policing powers created since 
2000 are used in discriminatory ways based on religious identity or in ways that exacerbate 
private violence against Muslims (Birt 2006, Chakrabarti 2007; HCCLGC2010; Kundnani 2009). 
Robust empirical study of the consequences of the interaction between police and minority 
communities, however, has been in short supply. Mythen et al. conducted focus groups with 32 
British Pakistanis aged 18-26 in northwest England and identified concerns about racial 
victimization and “excessive police stop searching (Mythen et al. 2009).” Based on field 
interviews, Haberfeld et al. also report confusion about the division of authority between local 
police and the security services in counter-terrorism and also a “disconnect between the law 
enforcement and the community (Haberfeld et al. 2009, 57)”. By contrast, an eleven-city 
European survey, including the English city of Leicester and the London borough of Waltham 
Forest, found levels of similar trust in police among Muslims and non-Muslims (OSI 2010, 169-
170). Based on focus groups conducted in conjunction with an eleven-city survey of Muslims in 
Europe, that study posited that trust in the police is high among European Muslims because of 
favorable comparisons between European police and police in a country of emigration (OSI 
2010, 172; see also Loader and Mulcahy 2003, 162). 
To summarize, past studies of British Muslims identify a population with an internal 
diversity of normative judgments about both terrorism and the British police. No previous study, 
however, has attempted to estimate the relationships between on the one hand, those judgments 
about the police and about terrorism, and on the other hand, cooperation with police that may 
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mitigate the risk of terrorist events occurring. (For studies of the Israeli context see Jonathan 
2010, Weisburd et al. 2010). This study exploits these relationships with the aim of identifying 
predictors of public cooperation with police in addressing terrorism.   
 
IV. Method 
A. Survey Methodology  
 This cross-sectional study of Muslims in London was conducted in two stages. The first 
stage was designed to gather information concerning British Muslims’ interactions with police in 
regard to terrorism. A snowball sample of one hundred non-quantitative, open-ended interviews 
was conducted with British Muslims in London. Interviewers were recruited through advertising 
in undergraduate and graduate faculties in Greater London. Data gathered through this non-
random sample was used to inform the survey design at the second stage. For example, the open-
ended survey was used to gather information about what members of the London Muslim 
community believed police to be doing to counter terrorism, the kind of foreign policy disputes 
that people believed most salient, and the distribution of contacts with law enforcement. This 
data was used in the design of a survey instrument for the second-stage randomly sampled part of 
the study. That data also includes material that can be used in the interpretation of quantitative 
data from the second stage. 
 In the second stage of the study, we conducted extended closed-ended interviews with a 
random sample of 300 individuals drawn from the population of Muslims residing in Greater 
London. This part of the study was conducted by the survey research firm SRBI and its London-
based affiliate Ethnic Focus. The respondents were identified though the following random walk 
method. London boroughs were divided into three strata according to the proportion of 
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population recorded as Muslim in the 2001 Census. Within each of these strata, boroughs were 
randomly drawn from a distribution weighted according to each one’s concentration of the 
aggregate London Muslim population. Within each borough, one ward was randomly selected. 
Equal numbers of interviews were conducted in each ward. Within each ward, a random walk 
method was used to identify respondents. Beginning at a designated random starting point, 
interviewers followed a random route protocol to identify doors to knock on. Noncontacted 
residences were revisited twice on different days, at evenings and at weekends. Interviewers 
spoke English, Urdu, Arabic and Bengali. During the face to face contact the interviewer 
described the study and obtained cooperation from the respondent. They were then called back 
and interviewed over the telephone. This procedure was used to allay suspicion about the 
purposes of the study and to secure higher levels of cooperation from respondents. In addition a 
stratified sampling methodology was used to produce demographic variance along gender and 
age dimensions.  
The procedure led to a high overall response rate of 81% using APPOR standard response 
rate definition three (A parallel study conducted in the United States with solely telephone 
contact and interviews obtained a response rate of 47%, see Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, 2010). 
Ninety percent of the interviews were conducted in English; 3% in Arabic; 5% in Urdu and 2% 
in Bengali. 
 Questions were drawn from two sources. First, previous studies of policing and 
legitimacy have developed questions to elicit views on deterrence and legitimacy (Tyler 2006b; 
Tyler & Fagan 2008) and procedural justice (Tyler & Fagan, 2008), measures adapted to 
counter-terrorism policing by Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq (2010). Second, the qualitative pre-test 
was used in the design of the telephone survey instrument.  
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Two methodological issues are of potential importance. First, whether the sample was 
comprised of respondents who were more likely than the average Muslim to speak to a survey 
researcher, and by extension more inclined to cooperate with police. We believe that this kind if 
sampling bias is unlikely given that the response rate for the survey of 81% using APPOR 
standard response rate definition three is high. The fact that it was a small proportion of 
individuals approached who declined to respond—the result of the random walk method of 
contacting respondents—makes it unlikely that the data suffers from a bias of this kind. On the 
contrary, the fact that respondents were initially approached in person and asked to cooperate in 
the study likely led the sample to be especially representative relative to typical telephone 
surveys. 
Second, respondents were asked about whether they would engage in various forms of 
cooperation in the future; we report this below as data on “cooperation.” We gathered no data, 
however, on what respondents would do if in fact presented with a situation in which cooperation 
with police was a possibility.  To some extent such behavior is by definition unobservable, since 
there is no simple way to know that someone could have cooperated but decided not to do so. 
Further resource and ethical constraints make it infeasible to observe directly how respondents 
react to occasions for cooperation in practice. The incidence of terrorism is not high enough to be 
able to secure statistically significant data without very large samples. Further, obvious ethical 
concerns arise in simulating terrorism risks to text experimentally respondents’ reactions. Data 
on expected cooperation is therefore the best data available. It is encouraging therefore that other 
studies have compared “self-reported” cooperation rates with independently observed behavior 
and found high levels of convergence (Blader and Tyler 2009; Tyler et al 2007) and that people’s 
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statements about their intentions to act are widely found to predict their subsequent behavior 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). 
B.  Demographics  
 The mean age of the sample is 35 and 50% are male. The sample is diverse in terms of 
both income and education.  For income 28% have an annual income of under ₤20,000; 30% 
between 20 and 30,000 pounds; 24% between 30 and 40,000 pounds; 14% between 40 and 
50,000 pounds; and 5% over ₤50,000. With respect to education, 17% had some schooling; 25% 
had completed secondary education; 21% had spent some time at university; 29% had completed 
a first university degree; and 8% some post-graduate or further professional education. 
C. Measures 
 This section describes the questions in the survey instruments and, as relevant, the scales 
used in the analysis. Appendix A provides a more detailed description of the questions used to 
construct each scale used in this analysis. Respondents were asked a series of closed-ended 
questions concerning their beliefs about and experiences of policing against terrorism, the British 
state and its relationship to British Muslims, and the legitimacy of the means and ends of 
terrorism. A majority of questions elicited answers on a four-point scale. Responses were 
combined to form scales to provide measures of both dependent and independent variables.  
 The study is focused on two dependent variables that measure different forms of 
cooperation with the police. The first measured general cooperation with the police in respect to 
counter-terrorism (“Work with the police”). This is based on questions concerning respondents' 
willingness to attend voluntary interviews or meetings called by the police. The second measured 
specific cooperation, i.e., the willingness to report different potentially suspicious incidents 
(“Alert the police”). We asked respondents whether they would contact police if they learned of 
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specific risk indicators, e.g., a neighbor constructing a bomb, visiting “radical” websites, or 
distributing al Qaeda literature. To control for differences in respondents’ prior views about the 
seriousness of a terror related behavior, we weighted likelihood of alerting by the respondent’s 
perception of an incident’s seriousness. In this weighting respondents were given greater weight 
for a stronger willingness to report terror threats that they judge to be especially serious. 
The instrumental model was tested primarily through two variables that measured on the 
one hand the perceived seriousness of the terrorism threat and on the other hand the effectiveness 
of police in addressing that threat. To test an alternative form of instrumental explanation, we 
also asked respondents whether they cooperated to avoid retaliation from the police.  
 The procedural justice model, as developed in previous studies, requires data on both 
judgments of legitimacy and procedural justice. We sought both kinds of data from respondents 
and report both below. In line with previous studies, two sets of questions measuring procedural 
justice were used. One set of questions looked at procedural justice in the process of policy 
formation. The other examined procedural justice in policy implementation. To measure 
legitimacy we asked respondents about two kinds of judgments. First, we asked about their 
feeling of obligation to obey the law and to defer to decisions made by legal authorities 
independent of sanction risks and experiences with punishment (“Legitimacy”), and trust and 
confidence in the police. Second, we measured identification with the police based on shared 
moral values. To do this, we used a scale of moral legitimacy constructed based on questions 
about the overlap in “values” between the respondent and the police (“Legitimacy-Moral”). We 
did so because it has been suggested that moral identification is important to police legitimacy in 
the United Kingdom (Jackson and Bradford, 2009). 
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 To measure ideology, we asked a series of questions to elicit respondents’ views on three 
general questions. First, we identified foreign policy questions mentioned in the literature of 
terrorist organizations (Kepel and Milelli 2010), and sought views about those political 
questions. Second, we sought information about respondents’ views about terrorism as a political 
strategy. Third, we obtained information about the strength of religious identification. Table 1c, 
discussed in more detail below, contains a list of the questions relevant to the three hypotheses 
tested in relation to ideology.  
 In addition to examining which of the three proposed mechanisms best explains general 
and specific cooperation with police, the survey instrument allowed a disaggregation and 
analysis of different policing tactics. This enables a more granular analysis of the interaction 
between policing choices and policed populations. Using exploratory factor analysis, we 
constructed three scales based on questions about respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of 
different kinds of policing tactics. First, a scale was constructed that measured how frequently 
police are perceived to engage in intrusive measures without any reference to group identity, e.g., 
searching people on public transport or questioning people at their homes (“Person Targeted”). 
This measure is intended to identify the perceived incidence of policing tactics that simply single 
out and burden individuals. Second, a scale was constructed that aggregated measures of how 
much police are perceived as targeting based on ethnicity or religion, in other words against the 
respondents’ own community (“Community Targeted”). This measure, by contrast, is intended to 
measure the perceived incidence of measures targeting groups qua groups. The third measure 
focused on the distinct concept of harassment, and builds on questions about perceptions of 
whether police threaten the use of excessive force against members of a respondent’s community 
(“Harass”).  
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V. Results  
A. Descriptive Statistics  
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics relevant to the three possible mechanisms 
(instrumental, normative, and ideological) and the two main independent variables tested 
(specific and general cooperation). The descriptive data demonstrate that the sample drawn has 
sufficient internal variation to enable examination of each of the three mechanisms. It also 
provides a useful overview of the population that is the focus of the study. Tables 1a, 1b and 1c 
present descriptive data concerning the relationship between beliefs, attitudes and expected 
behaviors respecting the police. Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c report the distribution of responses to 
questions concerning the instrumental, the normative, and the ideological mechanisms 
respectively.  This includes questions about police efficacy, the size of the terrorism threat, the 
fairness of police behavior, foreign policy judgments, views about terrorism, and religious 
identity. The first column of each table reports the percentage of respondents who either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with a proposition; the second column reports the percentage of 
respondents who either agreed or strongly agreed.  
Include Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c here. 
Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c suggest that the sample has considerable internal variance 
respecting all of the independent variables of interest. In the case of instrumental variables, a 
high proportion of the respondents do not believe the risk of terrorist violence in the United 
Kingdom to be large. In light of the historical record of attacks and attempted attacks since 2005, 
this is a perhaps surprising result. The sample was more evenly split on judgments of police 
efficacy. The sample also splits roughly evenly when evaluating the fairness of police behavior. 
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But a majority (82%) is inclined to view the police as a legitimate body whose decisions warrant 
deference.  
Respecting ideological mechanisms, the data suggest that political opposition for the 
policies of the UK government is very strong among British Muslims in London. More than 95% 
of respondents disagree with the decisions to use force in Afghanistan and to create a prison in 
Guantánamo Bay, while 70% disagree with the invasion of Iraq. Almost all (98%) disagree with 
support for Israel. By contrast, support for terrorism varies. Most respondents support the 
suggestion that terrorists have some valid grievances and many support terrorism itself, 
particularly for religious reasons. Finally, respondents reported strong identification with being 
Muslim and supported the idea of maintaining a separate culture. The sample thus generally 
identifies as religious. While the links between ideology and terrorism are empirically contested, 
this population nevertheless does seem to provide a context to conduct a strong test of the 
influence of various forms of ideology upon cooperation with the police against terrorism.  
 Tables 2a and 2b turn to the dependent variables of interest—specific and general 
cooperation. We present first descriptive data showing the distribution of attitudes toward police.  
Include Tables 2a and 2b here. 
Just as it is difficult to determine when ideology matters to the production of terrorism, so 
too it is difficult to say what level of cooperation is adequate and what level insufficient to 
maintain public order. More cooperation generally might be seen as better. But such cooperation 
will correlate to what the respondent views as legitimate police concerns, i.e., people will not 
report behavior that they do not feel should be a police concern. Table 2a and 2b show that 
respondents clearly do not view all types of activity as equally of concern to the police. Table 2a 
indicates that a majority of the sample (64%) are willing to volunteer and work with police. 
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Table 2b presents the data on specific cooperation. It demonstrates that there is a gap between 
what concerns respondents and what they are willing to report to the police. The most dramatic 
example of this gap arising in the respondences given to questions about knowing about a plan to 
plant explosives. In that case, 100% of respondents indicate that this is a proper police concern. 
But only 86% say that they would report the issue to the police. On another question, 35% of 
respondents indicate that someone withdrawing from a Mosque is a cause for police concern 
while only 20% would report it to the police. Hence, there is clearly some degree of reluctance to 
involve the police even when an issue might be evaluated as a legitimate police concern. 
B. What factors predict cooperation with the police within the sampled population of British 
Muslims? 
We turn next to the question of what best predicts the likelihood that members of the 
sampled population of British Muslims will state an intention to cooperate with the police. We 
address this question by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate the 
relationship between the two dependent variables of interest—general cooperation with police to 
fight terror and specific cooperation with police—and measures of the hypothesized 
instrumental, normative, and ideological mechanisms.  We present multiple regression 
specifications in order to illustrate findings about the three hypothesized mechanisms. 
Table 3 presents a simple specification. The dependent variables are specific and general 
cooperation in fighting terrorism. These are regressed against six indices and demographic 
variables (age, education, income, and gender): one corresponding to an instrumental 
mechanism, two corresponding to the procedural justice and legitimacy components of the 
normative mechanism; and three corresponding to the three hypothesized ideological variables. 
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This parsimonious specification does not take account of covariation among variables reflecting 
different categories.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
 Table 3 suggests first that the normative mechanism represented by procedural justice 
dominates both the instrumental mechanism and the various ideological mechanisms. This is so 
with respect to both general and specific cooperation. The data also suggests that legitimacy adds 
little to what is explained by procedural justice when considered alone. 
 Table 4 presents a more complex regression specification. Again, the dependent variables 
are general and specific cooperation. In this specification, more independent variables have been 
added to reflect different elements of each cluster (both specifications include demographics). 
All of the independent variables used in the model are listed in Table 4; they are also defined in 
Appendix A. Although this more complex specification allows for more precise estimation of the 
effects of different mechanisms, it also presents a greater risk of multicollinearity. Comparison 
of Table 3 to Table 4, however, allows us to identify possible multicollinearity problems.   
 Insert Table 4 here.  
Table 4 indicates that both general cooperation and specific willingness to alert the police 
are centrally influenced by procedural justice judgments. Both the fairness of the procedure by 
which government forms anti-terror policing policies and the fairness of the procedures through 
which such polices are implemented shape cooperation. Instrumental factors appear to have no 
significant effect on cooperation. As before, these findings do not support the argument that 
people’s ideologies—whether conceived in terms of political judgments, views about terrorism, 
or religiosity—shape their attitudes toward the police or the likelihood that they will cooperate 
with police in various ways. Ideology is generally irrelevant, as are background factors, 
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including religion. The normative mechanism again emerges as the best explanation for 
cooperation in the population being studied.  
Insert Table 5 here. 
Table 5 confirms the link between procedural justice and cooperation through the use of a 
stepwise regression procedure. It also provides a sharper focus on the relationship between the 
two elements of the normative model—procedural justice and legitimacy. Table 5 indicates that 
once the influence of procedural justice is accounted for, legitimacy contributes nothing more to 
our understanding of cooperation. Further, once procedural justice is included neither ideology 
nor religion contribute additional variance. Hence, this analysis reinforces the conclusion that 
procedural justice is the key antecedent of cooperation. 
 Finally, Figure 1 summarizes presents the entire model. The model fit the data well (CFI 
= 0.95; RMSEA = 0.06; Chi-square (27) = 56.8). As has been suggested, neither form of 
legitimacy directly shapes cooperation behavior. Instead, procedural justice directly shapes 
behavior and also influences legitimacy.  
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 As has been noted, prior studies of procedural justice typically find that procedural justice 
influences upon cooperation are mediated by legitimacy. In this study of a British Muslim 
population, however, the influence of procedural justice on cooperation is direct and legitimacy 
is not found to mediate the relationship between procedural justice and cooperation. That finding 
is reinforced by the overall model shown in Figure 1.  The implications of this finding will be 
addressed in the discussion. 
C. What is the impact of changing police behavior? 
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The centrality of procedural justice raises a further question of how the choice of policing 
measures influences perceptions of procedural justice. How the choice of tactics by police 
influences procedural justice judgments is clearly a salient question. The survey instrument 
allows for some further examination of that question. It included questions on respondents’ 
beliefs about the frequency of different kinds of policing tactics. Table 6 therefore presents an 
exploratory factor analysis of the police behavior data.  
Insert Table 6 here. 
This analysis suggests that respondents categorize police behavior into three different 
categories. One reflects behaviors targeted toward the Muslim community. Another involves 
actions targeting particular individuals. And the third reflects harassment of Muslims. 
Regression analysis was used to examine the influence of police actions upon legitimacy 
and procedural justice. The results of that analysis are shown in Table 7.  
Insert Table 7 here. [ 
The results presented in Table 7 suggest that targeting individuals is evaluated as fair, 
while targeting communities is regarded as being illegitimate and unfair. Further harassment is 
viewed as illegitimate and unfair. Hence, the Muslim community clearly recognizes and accepts 
a role for the intrusion of legal authorities into their community but reacts negatively to actions 
viewed as directed at the community, not individuals and to harassment. 
 
VI. Discussion  
 The central aim of this study is to understand the circumstances in which members of the 
British Muslim community cooperated with police in counter-terrorism efforts. We hypothesized 
that there are three mechanisms that might explain such cooperation: an instrumental model, a 
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procedural justice model, and three variations on “ideological” theories. The central finding of 
the study is that procedural justice concerns prove better predictors of cooperation of British 
Muslims in counter-terrorism policing than either instrumental or ideological mechanisms. 
Indeed we find no statistically significant relationship between either instrumental or ideological 
mechanisms and any form of cooperation, while procedural justice furnishes a consistently 
robust basis for explaining behavior. This result suggests that the procedural justice model 
developed in the context of studies of American policing has a broader scope. As discussed 
further below, however, the results of this study point to a different procedural justice 
mechanism than that observed in other studies, including a contemporaneous and parallel study 
of American Muslims.   
At an initial matter, we found no support for either instrumental or ideological 
mechanisms in the production of police-community cooperation against terrorism. An 
instrumental model of cooperation could be supported by two different mechanisms. First, 
cooperation could be a product of the expected benefits of policing. Second, cooperation could 
be supplied as a strategy for avoiding the unwelcome policing measures. Our study finds no 
evidence of either. People in the sample do not cooperate with the police because they think the 
police are effective or the threat of terror is great. The second instrumental mechanism is also not 
supported by the findings of this study. The hypothesized mechanism would require police to 
dial down levels of harassment in the presence of cooperation. But the data shows, to the 
contrary, that when they feel harassed, people cooperate less. To defend instrumental 
mechanisms, it might be argued that the absence of observed relationships is due to free rider 
effects, whereby the broad distribution of benefits from cooperation means that the concentrated 
costs of cooperation are not rationally undertaken by a discrete community (Olson, 1971). But 
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collective action logic cannot explain the observed significant variance in cooperation, or its 
correlation with non-instrumental factors. 
We also hypothesized three possible mechanisms by which ideology could influence 
cooperation with the police based on views about (foreign policy) politics, terrorism or religion. 
Testing each of these three theories, this study finds no evidence to suggest that ideology has any 
role in producing cooperation against terrorism. British Muslims in London appear not to change 
their behavior in respect to the police as they diverge increasingly from the foreign policy 
decisions of the British government. Nor do they change their conduct as they come to more 
willingly endorse terrorism as a political tool,. Nor does self-identification as a Muslim (or not) 
appear to influence cooperation or a person’s reported religiosity (or lack thereof) predict their 
attitude toward police. This last pair of findings parallels a finding in an analogous study of 
American Muslims, which also found no correlation between religiosity and cooperation (Tyler 
et al. 2010). It suggests that religiosity alone does not present a public order question, contrary to 
some conventional claims (Philips 2007).  
Interestingly, the study finds no correlation between judgments about terrorism as an 
instrument of political change and the willingness to cooperate with law enforcement against 
terrorism. The failure to find any relationship of this kind is especially striking because, as Table 
2c illustrates, the sample included a considerable range of view about terrorism. Nontrivial 
segments of the sample stated that terrorism could, in some instances, be justified. This belief did 
not appear to influence attitudes toward cooperation with the police. Although the data do not 
provide a precise explanation of this effect, it would seem that the sampled British Muslim 
population distinguishes between terrorism as a local threat and terrorism as an abstract idea: 
That terrorism may be justified in some instances does not entail that it is justified now and here. 
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This suggests complex judgments about means-ends rationality, with violence being seen as 
more acceptable under some conditions. Those judgments present a potential subject of further 
inquiry.   
Finally, the procedural justice model draws strong support from the results of this study. 
Both general and specific forms of cooperation were strongly predicted for this sample by 
procedural justice. While general cooperation was correlated with procedural justice at both the 
policy formation and the policy implementation stages, specific cooperation in the form of 
alerting the police was correlated primarily with procedural justice at the policy implementation 
stage.  
These findings are consistent with other studies, including studies of Muslim American’s 
interaction with counter-terrorism policing (Tyler et al. 2010), which have also failed to identify 
robust support for instrumental explanations of cooperation with law enforcement (or 
compliance with the law). The findings presented here also parallel the findings of a larger body 
of procedural justice literature respecting crime control (Tyler 2006b).  
These results are subtly, but interestingly, divergent from results from a study by Tyler et 
al. of American Muslims’ responses to counter-terrorism policing (Tyler et al. 2010). That study 
found that only procedural justice in policy formation influenced specific cooperation, but only 
procedural justice in implementation influenced general cooperation. In the counter-terrorism 
context, these results suggest, American and British Muslims negotiating with the state attend to 
different parts of the state’s decision-making process. While American Muslims are focused on 
both policy formation and implementation (in different ways), British Muslims are focused more 
on policy formation. The data do not yield an explanation for the difference, but the gap is at 
least mildly suggestive of the distance between a society that protects interests though 
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individualized assertion and rights-based judicial action and a society that defines rights and 
interests more through deliberative and legislative processes.   
 If British Muslims are attentive to the way in which policy is implemented, but even 
more attentive to the way it is formulated, this raises questions for further research. Our survey 
instrument did not examine perceptions of different mechanisms for community input and 
participation in policy formation. But the difference between various modalities of consultation, 
participation, and collaboration may warrant study. An example from a period prior to this study 
is illustrative. In the wake of the July 2005 bomb attacks in London, the Blair government 
established seven working groups that included members of the British Muslim community to 
investigate extremism and recommend initiatives to tackle it. The working groups were given six 
weeks to finish reports. Two weeks after they wound up, the government published a twelve-
point plan for responding to domestic terrorism. According to one Muslim member of the House 
of Lords who participated in the working groups, the latter were given too little time to develop a 
meaningful analysis. The government’s twelve measures were also drafted “without waiting for 
[the working group] to come up with [its] recommendations, or indeed, [its] analysis of the 
problems (Oborne 2008, 129).” That government effort at community engagement was widely 
discounted as “shallow spin” and so may not have had a procedural justice effect (Oborne 2008, 
130). While any negative effects from the working groups may well have worn off by the time of 
our study, it is worth asking more generally how different forms of consultation, perceived in 
different ways, can have different procedural justice effects. That is, if consultation is to part of 
the bundle of counter-terrorism policies, how can it be designed for best effect?  
 The results here also diverge in another important respect from the parallel study of 
American Muslims and from the body of procedural justice studies more generally. Unlike those 
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studies, this study finds a gap between procedural justice and legitimacy. People in our sample 
do not view the police as more legitimate because they are fair and therefore cooperate more 
with the police. Rather, they looked directly to procedural justice without necessarily using that 
information to form a separate legitimacy judgment. In past studies the effect of procedural 
justice on cooperation and compliance has been found to be mediated by legitimacy (Tyler 
2006b). That is, people appear to form normative judgments about the police based on 
perceptions of procedural justice, and it is these second-order judgments that are drawn upon 
when making cooperation and compliance decisions. The effect is not universal, and is not found 
in some studies conducted in China (Brockner et al. 2001). This study, by contrast, does find that 
procedural justice has a direct effect on cooperation but also finds that legitimacy does not have 
an intermediating role. That is, procedural justice predicts both cooperation and legitimacy, but 
legitimacy has no independent role in explaining cooperation.    
 The data provide no ready explanation for this result. One way to interpret this result, 
however, would focus on the perceived place of Muslims within British society and culture as a 
consequence of policies respecting the treatment and integration of migrant groups. British 
Muslim and their American counterparts are part of the same post-World War II migrant 
diasporas, but have been subject to different strategies of immigration and assimilation (Brown 
2006; Shukla 2003). The procedural justice/legitimacy gap identified in this study may point to 
one downstream effect of those different immigration/integration/assimilation strategies. British 
Muslims, the data suggests, stand in British society but do not feel of British society. And the 
contrast with the parallel New York study suggests that they stand in this regard on different 
ground from American counterparts, who see themselves both in and of their society. So, for 
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example, in this study identification with the UK does not predict cooperation, while in the 
parallel US sample identification with the US strongly predicts cooperation. 
Those who identify with the overall society see themselves as having obligations to the 
state (Huo, 2003; Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996; Smith & Tyler, 1996). They respond to the 
way the state behaves—and form long-term normative assessments of the state. The relationship 
of British Muslims to the state, by contrast, appears to be more contingent and less durable. 
Goodwill may be more strongly linked to personal connections and personal treatment by 
authorities. Levels of compliance and cooperation with police may also vary more depending 
upon experiences with state authority. The result bears further investigation, not merely as part of 
the procedural justice model, but also as part of an effort to understand the long-term effects of 
different migration and assimilation strategies.  
Conclusion 
 The mechanisms of cooperation among British Muslims in efforts against terrorism 
importantly follow the procedural justice pathway identified in other literature. But they also 
diverge from the standard account because of the surprisingly minor role played by legitimacy. 
Whether there are distinctive psychological or sociological explanations for the divergence of the 
studied population is an important subject for further research.  
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Appendix A 
Cooperate with the police. Respondents were asked “How willing would you be to”: 
“Work with the police to educate people in your community about the dangers of terrorists and 
terrorism?”; “To volunteer time on nights and weekends to help patrol areas of your community 
so as to help free police time to deal with anti-terror activities”; “To voluntarily attend a police 
call-in interview at a government office?:’ “To encourage members of your community to 
generally cooperate with police efforts to fight terrorism?; and “To go to the police if you see 
dangerous terror related activity going on” (alpha = 0.61). 
Alert the police. This variable was constructed by combining whether the respondent felt 
that the issue was a police concern and whether they would report the issue to the police. 
Police concern. How concerned would you be about: “A person saying he or she had 
joined a group you consider politically radical”; “A person withdrawing from a mosque or 
another religious community without any explanation”; “A person overheard discussing their 
decision to help plant explosives in a terrorist attack”: “A person visiting an internet chat room or 
web site in which there is material posted that supports al Qaeda”; “A person reading religious 
literature you believe to be extremist”; “A person giving money to organizations that people say 
are associated with terrorists”; “A person talking about traveling overseas to fight for Muslims”; 
and A person distributive material expressing support for al Qaeda” (alpha = 0.67) 
Likelihood of reporting to the police. How likely would you be to report to the police: “A 
person saying he or she had joined a group you consider politically radical”; “A person 
withdrawing from a mosque or another religious community without any explanation”; “A 
person overheard discussing their decision to help plant explosives in a terrorist attack”: “A 
person visiting an internet chat room or web site in which there is material posted that supports al 
Qaeda”; “A person reading religious literature you believe to be extremist”; “A person giving 
money to organizations that people say are associated with terrorists”; “A person talking about 
traveling overseas to fight for Muslims”; and A person distributive material expressing support 
for al Qaeda” (alpha = 0.75) 
Seriousness of terror risk. One question was asked. “Would you agree strongly, agree, 
disagee, or disagree strongly that” “There is a serious risk of a major terrorist attack in the UK.” 
Police performance. Two questions were asked: “How would you rate the police in terms 
of whether they are making you feel safe from the threat of terrorism?” and “If someone were 
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planning a terrorist attack in London today, how likely do you think it is that they would be 
caught in advance” (alpha = 0.76). 
Cooperate to prevent harm. One question was asked: “Some people think that if they do 
not help the police, the police will be more aggressive when they deal with the Muslim 
community. How often do you think this happens?”. 
The fairness of policy formation. Three questions were asked. The first two begin: “How 
much does the government involve your community when”: “Making decisions about what 
actions to take to address the threat of terrorism in your community”; and “Trying to deal with 
problems in your community not related to terrorism”. And “How often does the government 
convent meetings in your community to hear about community concerns about how the police 
should deal with the threat of terrorism?” (alpha = 0.76). 
The fairness of policy implementation. Ten questions were asked reflecting overall 
procedural justice, quality of decision making and quality of interpersonal treatment (alpha = 
0.82). Respondents were asked to agree or disagree that when dealing with terrorism the police 
were fair: “In the procedures they use to handle the problems they deal with”; “How they treat 
people”; “In giving people a chance to express their views before making decisions”; “In 
accurately understanding and applying the law”; “In making their decisions based upon facts, not 
their personal opinions”; “In applying the law consistently to everyone”; “In considering 
people’s views when deciding what to do”; “Taking account of the needs and concerns of the 
people they deal with”; “In respecting people’s rights”; and “In treating people with dignity and 
respect”. 
Legitimacy. A six item scale was used. That scale combined obligation and trust & 
confidence. The items were: “The police are legitimate authorities and you should obey their 
decisions”; “You should accept the decisions made by the police even when you disagree with 
them”; “It is our duty to obey the police even when we do not like the way they treat us”; “The 
police generally treat people with dignity and respect when they are investigating and 
prosecuting terrorism:”; “You trust the police to make decisions that are good for everyone when 
they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism”: “People’s rights are generally well protected 
by the police when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism” (alpha = 0.68). 
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Morality. A two item scale was used: “The actions that the police take in dealing with 
terrorism are consistent with your own moral values”; and “Your own values about what is right 
and wrong agree with the laws and rules concerning how to deal with terrorism” (alpha = 0.69). 
Is terrorism immoral? Three questions were asked: “Some people think that suicide 
bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets is sometimes justified to defend 
Islam against enemies. Do you think such violence is sometimes justified, is rarely justified or is 
never justified (reverse scored)”; “It is always morally wrong to commit a terrorist act that risks 
the lives of civilians”; and “Sometimes the long-term good to society that comes out of terrorist 
acts outweighs the short-terms hard to the particular people injured or killed (reverse scored)” 
(alpha = 0.64). 
Are the ends of terrorism justified? One question was asked: “Do you personally think 
that terrorist violence undertaken for political reasons is sometimes justified, is rarely justified or 
is never justified?”. 
Support government foreign policies? Four questions were asked: “The U.K. made the 
right decision using military force in Afghanistan”; “Participation in the 2003 invasion and 
occupation of Iraq by the U.K. was necessary to combat threats of terrorism”; “Israel should 
withdraw all its troops and settlements from the territories it occupies on the West Bank”; and 
“The establishment of the American prison on Guantanamo Bay was morally wrong” (alpha = 
.50). 
Identification as a Muslim. Two questions were asked: “Being a Muslim is important to 
the way that I think of myself as a person”; and “I am proud to be Muslim” (alpha = .54). 
Identification with the UK. Four questions were asked: “I am proud to be British”; “What 
the UK stands for is important to me”; “When someone praises the UK, it feels like a personal 
compliment to me”; and “Being British is important to the way that I think of myself as a 
person” (alpha = .57). 
Muslims should keep separate. Two questions were asked: “Muslims should try to keep a 
separate cultural identity”; and “Muslims in the UK today should try to remain distinct from the 
larger society” (alpha = 0.86). 
How religious are you? Four questions were asked: “Would you say that religion is a 
very important part of your daily life”; “How often do you pray”:’ How often do you attend a 
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mosque”: and “How often do you take part in social or religious activities in a mosque or Islamic 
center” (alpha = 0.72). 
Muslims are respected by the British. Respondents were asked “Do you think that non-
Muslim British”: “Respect how you live your life”; “Respect what you contribute to England”; 
and “Respect what you believe” (0.55). 
Muslims are discriminated against in society. Three questions were asked: “At work or in 
schools”; “When dealing with authorities in public institutions”; and “In the media” (alpha = 
0.42). 
Have you changed your religious practices? Respondents were asked: “How much have 
your changed your religious practices because of concerns about how will be treated by others?”: 
“Changed attendance at prayers?”; “Changed how you dress in public”: “Altered your everyday 
activities?:’ or “Changed your travel behavior” (alpha = .82). 
Police actions directed at the person. “Search people on trains or the underground”; 
“Come to people’s homes to ask questions”; and “Use informants from the community who are 
placed in mosques or community organizations” (alpha = .72). 
Police actions directed at the community. “Conduct electronic surveillance of mosques or 
community organizations”; “Single out people on the streets for questioning and searches based 
upon ethnicity/religion”; “Single out members of your ethnic or religious group for greater 
attention at immigration or at airport security”; “Listen to the telephone calls or read the e-mail 
of people in your community”; “Tracy money contributed to Islamic charities by people in your 
community”; “Pub people from your community on trial for terror related crimes”; and “Conduct 
raids on homes of people in your community to arrest people” (alpha = .82). 
Police harass Muslims. Would you agree or disagree that: “The police are especially 
suspicious of people from your community”; “Use too much force when dealing with people 
from your community”; “Threaten people from your community with physical harm”; and 
“Threaten to arrest or deport people from your community unless they cooperate” (alpha = .60). 
Age. Respondents indicated the year they were born. 
Education. Respondents indicated their level of education. 
Income. Respondents reported annual family income. 
Gender. The interviewer coded gender. 
 
8/29/2011 
 
39 
 
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics: instrumental mechanisms 
 
Instrumental Reasons 
There is a serious risk of a major 
terrorist attack in the United 
Kingdom at this time.  
Disagree strongly/disagree 
80% 
Agree strongly/agree 
20% 
It is likely that the police would 
catch someone planning a 
terrorist attack in London. 
Not at all likely/a little likely 
50% 
Very/somewhat likely 
50% 
 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive statistics: normative mechanisms 
 
Normative Reasons 
The police generally treat people 
with dignity and respect when 
they are investigating and 
prosecuting terrorism.  
Seldom/almost never 
54% 
Usually/sometimes 
46% 
The government takes your 
views and the views of your 
community into account when 
making decisions about what 
actions to take to address the 
threat of terrorism if those 
actions affect your community.  
Not much at all/a little 
65% 
A great deal/somewhat 
35% 
The police are legitimate 
authorities and you should obey 
their decisions.  
Disagree strongly/disagree 
18% 
Agree strongly/agree 
82% 
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Table 1c: Descriptive statistics: three ideological mechanisms 
 
 
Political Differences 
The UK made the right decision 
using military force in 
Afghanistan 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
96% 
Agree strongly/agree 
4% 
Participation in the 2003 invasion 
and occupation of Iraq by the UK 
was necessary to combat threats 
of terrorism 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
70% 
Agree strongly/agree 
30% 
The establishment of the 
American prison on Guantanamo 
Bay was morally wrong 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
4% 
Agree strongly/agree 
96% 
Israel should withdraw all its 
troops and settlements from the 
territories it occupies on the West 
Bank 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
2% 
 
Agree strongly/agree 
98% 
Judgments about Terrorism  
Terrorists often have valid 
grievances 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
24% 
Agree strongly/agree 
76% 
Terrorism is sometimes justified 
to defend Islam 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
58% 
Agree strongly/agree 
42% 
The long-term good of terrorism 
sometimes outweighs the short 
term harm 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
77% 
Agree strongly/agree 
23% 
Terrorism is sometimes justified 
for political reasons 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
84% 
Agree strongly/agree 
16% 
It is sometimes morally 
acceptable to commit terrorist 
acts 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
91% 
Agree strongly/agree 
9% 
Religious identity 
Being a Muslim is important to 
the way you think of yourself as 
a person 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
8% 
Agree strongly/agree 
92% 
How strongly do you identify as 
a Muslim 
Not at all/not very strongly 
38% 
Very/somewhat strongly 
62 
Muslims in the UK today should 
teach their children to adopt 
British customs and ways of 
Disagree strongly/disagree 
79% 
Agree strongly/agree 
21% 
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Table 2a: Descriptive statistics: measures of general cooperation with law enforcement  
 
Cooperation 
 
Very/somewhat 
unlikely 
Very/somewhat 
likely 
Work with the police to educate 
people in your community about 
the dangers of terrorism. 
52% 48% 
Volunteer time on nights or 
weekends to help patrol areas of 
your neighborhood. 
77% 23% 
Encourage members of your 
community to cooperate with the 
police. 
36% 64% 
Go to the police if you see 
dangerous activity. 13% 87% 
 
Table 2b: Descriptive statistics: measures of specific cooperation with law enforcement  
 
 Concerned? Alert police? 
Alert the police? Not at all/not very 
Somewhat
/very Unlikely Likely 
A person saying he/she had joined a 
group you consider politically radical. 58% 42% 63% 37% 
A person withdrawing from a mosque 
without any explanation. 65% 35% 80% 20% 
A person overheard discussing their 
decision to help plant explosives in a 
terrorist attack. 
0% 100% 14% 86% 
A person visiting internet chat rooms in 
which material supporting al Qaeda is 
presented. 
9% 91% 43% 57% 
A person reading extremist religious 
literature. 43% 57% 73% 27% 
A person giving money to organizations 
that people say are associated with 
terrorists. 
32% 68% 57% 43% 
A person talking about traveling overseas 
to fight for Muslims. 46% 54% 69% 31% 
A person distributing material expressing 
support for al Qaeda. 29% 71% 45% 55% 
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Table 3: Predictors of specific and general cooperation:  
a simple specification 
 
 Cooperation Alert the police 
Demographics 0% 0% 
Instrumental concerns 6%** 3%* 
Procedural justice and 
legitimacy 
23%*** 17%*** 
--Procedural justice 
alone 
22%*** 17%*** 
--Legitimacy alone 5%*** 7%*** 
Ideology 3%* 3%* 
--Foreign policy 0% 0% 
--Terrorism 2%* 2%* 
--Religious 
identification 
2%* 2%* 
Religion 7%*** 0% 
Overall 23%*** 14%*** 
 
 
Note. The overall percentage of variance in the case of alert is higher (17%) for procedural 
justice alone than for all the variables (14%). This happens because the results are adjusted for 
the number of independent variables in the equation and in the case of alerting the police there 
are many nonsignificant predictors in the overall equation. 
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Table 4. OLS regression of indexes of instrumental, normative, and ideological mechanisms 
on specific and general cooperation 
 
 Cooperate Alert the police 
Combined legitimacy .16* -- .23*** -- 
Procedural justice     
 Policy formation -- .21*** -- .14* 
 Policy implementation -- .31*** -- .36*** 
Ideology     
 Terrorism is moral -.14* .13 -.09 .08 
 Terrorism is politically acceptable .08 .06 .07 .06 
 Evaluation of government policy -.08 -.09 -.03 -.05 
 Muslim identification -.08 -.04 .01 .05 
 UK identification .01 -.02 .02 .01 
 Muslims should keep separate .04 -.03 .11 .04 
Instrumental factors     
 Terror is serious -.13 -.11 -.01 .01 
 Police are effective -.03 -.01 -.02 .01 
 Cooperation to avoid retaliation .12 .08 .10 .06 
Religion     
 I am religious .10 .11 .08 .09 
 People respect Muslims -.12 -.07 .01 .04 
 I have changed my religious practices 
due to  discrimination 
.05 -.01 .10 .04 
 Society discriminates against Muslims -.18* .11 .02 -.09 
Demographics     
 Age .00 .03 .05 .06 
 Education .03 .03 -.06 -.06 
 Income -.01 -.01 .07 .06 
 Gender -.06 -.06 .07 .05 
Total adjusted R.-sq. 12% 23% 6% 14% 
 
 
Table 4 has four columns because within each dependent variable there are two equations. One 
looks at the influence of legitimacy. The other looks at the influence of the two measures of 
procedural justice. 
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Table 5. Stepwise analysis of factors shaping cooperation. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Demographics x x x x x 
Instrumental variables  x x x x 
Procedural justice   x x x 
Legitimacy    x x 
Ideology and religion     x 
Adjusted R.-sq. 0% 3% 24% 24% 24% 
 
The dependent variable is a combined measure of cooperation. 
8/29/2011 
 
45 
 
Table 6: Factor analysis of police behaviors 
 
 Community Person Harass 
Single out people to stop based on ethnicity. 0.57 -- -- 
Single out people at immigration and airports based upon 
ethnicity. 
0.59 -- -- 
Conduct electronic surveillance of Mosques. 0.55 -- -- 
Listen to telephone calls or read e-mails from your 
community. 
0.59 -- -- 
Trace money contributed to Islamic charities. 0.76 -- -- 
Put people from the Muslim community on trial. 0.70 -- -- 
Conduct raids of people in the Muslim community. 0.72 -- -- 
Search people on trains or in underground. -- 0.75 -- 
Come to people’s homes and ask questions. -- 0.77 -- 
Use informants to identify people in Mosques. -- 0.71 -- 
Are especially suspicious of Muslims. -- -- .48 
Use too much force when dealing with Muslims. -- -- .56 
Threaten Muslims with physical harm. -- -- .83 
Threaten to arrest or deport Muslims. -- -- .77 
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Table 7: The impact of police behavior on procedural justice judgments 
 
 Police performance
Procedural 
justice of 
policy 
formation 
Procedural 
justice of policy 
implementation 
Person targeted 
behavior .07 .22*** .07 
Community 
targeted behavior .00 -.34*** -.14* 
Harassment -.20*** -.13* -.16** 
Seriousness of 
terror .02 -.03 -.03 
Police 
performance --- -.03 .21*** 
Adjusted R.-sq. 3%* 10%*** 9%*** 
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Figure 1: Full causal model 
 
 
Legitimacy-
morality
Legitimacy
Alert 
police
Cooperate 
with police
Pro-terror politics
Pro-terror morally
PJ - Formation
PJ-implementation
Target people
Target community
Figure 1.  Full model.
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